Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Sixth Objections', 'In Defence of Pure Reason' and 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour]
For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour]
Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes]