Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Discourse on Method', 'Possibility' and 'Vagueness and Contradiction'

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72 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes]
Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien]
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien]
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien]
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes]
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen]