47 ideas
3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
16705 | Whiteness isn't created in an alteration, because it is just this-being-white [Oresme] |
16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |