Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Discourse on Method', 'Category Mistakes' and 'The Particle Zoo'

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93 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes]
Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor]
Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor]
Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor]
Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor]
The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor]
Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor]
A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor]
If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor]
Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor]
If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / d. Category mistake as pragmatic
Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor]
In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor]
Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor]
'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor]
Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / e. Category mistake as ontological
The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes]
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor]
'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor]
Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor]
Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor]
In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor]
The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / c. Presupposition
A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor]
A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor]
The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor]
If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor]
Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor]
Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor]
Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor]
Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor]
One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor]
Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor]
The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor]
Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh]
Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh]
Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh]
Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh]
Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh]
In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh]
Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh]