54 ideas
10468 | A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver] |
10471 | Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver] |
10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
10750 | Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
9912 | There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf] |
9901 | Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf] |
9151 | Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K] |
13891 | To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C] |
17904 | A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf] |
17906 | To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf] |
9898 | We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf] |
17903 | Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf] |
9897 | The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf] |
9900 | For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf] |
9899 | The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf] |
8697 | Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend] |
8304 | No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe] |
9906 | If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf] |
9907 | If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf] |
9908 | The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf] |
9909 | The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf] |
9911 | Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf] |
8925 | Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf] |
9938 | How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam] |
9910 | Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf] |
9903 | Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf] |
9904 | The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf] |
10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver] |
10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver] |
10719 | There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver] |
10721 | If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver] |
10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
10720 | We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver] |
10714 | The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver] |
10715 | There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver] |
10738 | Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver] |
10739 | The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver] |
10740 | The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver] |
10741 | Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver] |
10742 | Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver] |
10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver] |
10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
10722 | Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver] |
10744 | Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver] |
10726 | Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver] |
10725 | Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver] |
9905 | Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf] |
10745 | Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver] |
3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
10746 | Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver] |