Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet', 'Introduction to 'Absolute Generality'' and 'Intending'

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11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
13451 The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
13452 Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
13449 We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
13450 Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13453 Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
2602 What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2600 The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes]
2601 Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
13448 The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20024 Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]