42 ideas
| 3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
| 9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
| 9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
| 16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
| 5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
| 5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
| 16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
| 14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
| 14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
| 16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
| 5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
| 14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
| 16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
| 14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
| 14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
| 14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
| 14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
| 14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
| 14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
| 9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
| 14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
| 9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
| 9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
| 9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
| 3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
| 5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
| 5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
| 5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
| 5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
| 5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
| 5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
| 5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
| 5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| 5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
| 9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
| 5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
| 5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
| 5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
| 15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
| 12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
| 16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |