Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet', 'What is it like to be a bat?' and ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?'

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11 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
2602 What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
3286 An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3288 Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
4883 Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
3287 We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
4989 Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2600 The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes]
2601 Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes]