Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Voetius', 'Perception' and 'The Idea of Justice'

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50 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H]
Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H]
Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H]
Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H]
If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H]
If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen]
Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 13. Green Politics
Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen]
Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen]
All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen]
Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen]
Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen]
We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen]
If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country [Descartes]