18 ideas
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |