Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Homeostasis, Species and Higher Taxa', 'A Short History of Ethics' and 'Sameness and Substance'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
The properties of an electron can't be explained just as 'clustering' [Chakravartty on Boyd]
Properties cluster together, either because of intrinsic relations, or because of an underlying process [Boyd, by Chakravartty]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre]