Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositions', 'The Reasons of Love' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'

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36 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin]
Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin]