Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositions', 'Rationality in Action' and 'There are no ordinary things'

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46 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
3811 Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
3822 Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3812 Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
3806 Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
3809 If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
3810 In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3841 Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9052 Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
16070 There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3816 Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
3833 A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
3828 Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3830 In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
3823 Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
3821 Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
3824 A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
3834 An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
3825 Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
3814 Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
3840 We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
3815 The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
3839 Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
3835 If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
3836 If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
3838 Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3813 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]