23 ideas
12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |