Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', 'Papers of 1918' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

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9 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12801 Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
12800 Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
12802 We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
12803 Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
22307 Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]