10 ideas
| 12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
| 12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
| 12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |