Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'Physiologia'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
The quantity is just the matter, in that it has extended parts and is diffuse [Charleton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]