13 ideas
12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15538 | Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
15537 | If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis] |
15536 | We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |