Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', 'Reality without Reference' and 'Pragmatism and Objective Truth'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]