Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', 'Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?' and 'Aspects of the Theory of Syntax'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

10 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12801 Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
13857 Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
13853 It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
13855 A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
13859 X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
13854 Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
12800 Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
12802 We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
12803 Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
18006 Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor]