Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', 'Mathematics and Indispensibility' and 'Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12801 Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14626 In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
9558 All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
14625 Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14623 Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
14624 Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14531 Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
12800 Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
12802 We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
12803 Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14628 Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson]