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All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' and 'Parts of Classes'

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109 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong]
We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis]
A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis]
We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis]
There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis]
We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis]
If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis]
Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis]
Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis]
A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis]
Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis]
Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant]
The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant]
Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant]
The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman]
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant]
The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant]
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant]
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant]
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant]
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant]
Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant]
There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant]
Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant]
Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham]
Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant]
A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson]
Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant]
The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant]
I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant]
Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG]
Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant]
Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant]
If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant]
Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant]
The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant]
Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant]
Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie]
Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant]
Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse]
If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant]
If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant]
Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant]
The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant]
Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant]
Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant]
We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B]