35 ideas
| 12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
| 13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
| 11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
| 17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
| 17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
| 11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
| 11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
| 13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
| 11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
| 11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
| 11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
| 11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
| 17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
| 17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
| 17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
| 12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
| 12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
| 12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
| 17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
| 11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
| 17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
| 11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
| 17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
| 17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
| 17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
| 17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
| 17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
| 17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
| 17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
| 17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
| 11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
| 17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
| 17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |