Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', 'Could There Be Unicorns?' and 'Shame and Necessity'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12801 Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
16951 It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16953 Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett]
16952 If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
16960 If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
16958 In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16957 Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
16959 If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
12800 Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
12802 We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
12803 Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
2174 Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
2178 In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
16956 To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
16954 Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
2175 There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]