13 ideas
| 12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
| 23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
| 12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
| 12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
| 12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
| 23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
| 23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
| 22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
| 23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
| 22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
| 22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
| 23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |