Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', '67: Platonic Questions' and 'Three Varieties of Knowledge'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]