Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief', 'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12801 Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
12800 Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
12802 We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
12803 Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
6248 Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6238 We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
6239 We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
6240 The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
6242 We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
6247 Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
6244 Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
6243 As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6246 My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
22717 Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
22718 Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone]
22719 The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 7. Prisoner's Dilemma
22720 Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone]
22721 The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
22722 TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone]
22723 Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
6241 Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
6245 That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
6251 The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
6250 We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
6249 If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]