14 ideas
18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
22456 | Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot] |