19 ideas
| 14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
| 14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
| 14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
| 14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
| 14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
| 14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
| 14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 5126 | A carelessly thrown brick is condemned much more if it hits someone [Smith,A, by Harman] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |