Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Occasions of Identity' and 'Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner]
Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]