Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments' and 'Letter to Menoeceus'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus]
The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus]
Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]