Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'City of God' and 'Tusculan Disputations'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
5893 A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
5891 Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
3912 I must exist in order to be mistaken, so that even if I am mistaken, I can't be wrong about my own existence [Augustine]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
5879 The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5884 How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero]
5887 The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5886 Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
6683 The contact of spirit and body is utterly amazing, and incomprehensible [Augustine]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5885 Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
5890 We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
5894 All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
5895 If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero]