15 ideas
4869 | Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
4581 | Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume] |
4580 | All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
4579 | The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume] |
20705 | That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume] |