31 ideas
| 19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
| 6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
| 6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
| 6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
| 6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
| 6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
| 6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
| 6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
| 6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
| 7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
| 19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
| 19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
| 10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
| 6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
| 6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
| 21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
| 6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
| 5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
| 6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
| 19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |