20 ideas
| 19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
| 21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
| 21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
| 7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
| 19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
| 19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
| 5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
| 19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |