17 ideas
| 5952 | Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch] |
| 5951 | If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch] |
| 22306 | To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell] |
| 20796 | Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 5948 | The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 5950 | If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch] |
| 5955 | No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch] |