Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic' and 'Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed)'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
22329 Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
22180 Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22172 Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha]
22177 Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22174 The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha]
22175 Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22182 Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
22185 Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
22176 Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
22178 If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
21569 It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
22173 Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha]