Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Logical Atomism' and 'Knowledge and its Limits'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
6118 Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
6116 A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6117 Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
6110 Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6107 It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6115 Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
6109 Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
6108 Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
10968 Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
6113 To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
6114 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
21722 Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
6111 As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
4760 Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19512 Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6112 Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]