19 ideas
12772 | Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen] |
12771 | Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen] |
12773 | Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen] |
12770 | We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen] |
12769 | Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen] |
12768 | We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen] |
14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |