15 ideas
| 14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
| 14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
| 14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
| 14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
| 20959 | Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |