16 ideas
9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |