19 ideas
| 21103 | Moral questions can only be decided by common opinion [Hume] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 21099 | People must have agreed to authority, because they are naturally equal, prior to education [Hume] |
| 20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
| 21100 | The idea that society rests on consent or promises undermines obedience [Hume] |
| 20495 | We no more give 'tacit assent' to the state than a passenger carried on board a ship while asleep [Hume] |
| 21101 | The people would be amazed to learn that government arises from their consent [Hume] |
| 6703 | Poor people lack the knowledge or wealth to move to a different state [Hume] |
| 21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
| 21102 | We all know that the history of property is founded on injustices [Hume] |