18 ideas
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
22410 | Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B] |
22408 | Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B] |
22411 | For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
22409 | We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B] |
22407 | Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B] |
9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |