16 ideas
| 7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
| 7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
| 7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
| 9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
| 9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |