42 ideas
| 125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
| 1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
| 4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
| 114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
| 135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
| 128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
| 4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
| 136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
| 134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
| 4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
| 132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
| 130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
| 120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
| 118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
| 140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
| 131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
| 129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
| 119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
| 4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
| 141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
| 123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
| 124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |