34 ideas
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |