17 ideas
| 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
| 10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
| 12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
| 12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
| 12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
| 12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |