37 ideas
| 16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
| 16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
| 16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
| 16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
| 16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
| 16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
| 16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
| 16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
| 16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
| 16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
| 16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
| 16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
| 16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
| 16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
| 16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
| 16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
| 16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
| 16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
| 5078 | Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R] |
| 5067 | Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 5079 | Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R] |
| 5068 | 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R] |
| 5076 | To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R] |
| 5077 | The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R] |
| 5066 | If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R] |
| 5065 | The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |