Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags)' and 'Semantic Necessity'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
14519 It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
14518 In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
14620 Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
14524 Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14530 The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
14521 If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
14618 Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
14621 Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14622 Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
14619 The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
14522 What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
3563 Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
3560 Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
14517 We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
14513 Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
14515 A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
14520 It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus]