32 ideas
14519 | It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus] |
14518 | In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
14521 | If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
14522 | What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus] |
3563 | Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus] |
3560 | Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus] |
14517 | We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus] |
14513 | Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
14515 | A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus] |
14520 | It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus] |